Understanding The American Empire

The American empire has no history, in 1954 the United States intervened unilaterly to protect against vital interests, in 1948 it intervened in the middle east to still the interest of the targeted countries, the rich middle eastern countries in Laus, Congo, Brazil, there is so many theories about what is happening in Iraq, i won't really want to go in, but if you look to the history of the United States, every most president there is something that we don't really want, we don't like somewhere in the world and we get to do something, and we get to dispense some military force.
"Ronald Reagon" invaded Panama in 1983 this is not about a party, the United States fight as a nation, it percieved that it is in its interest to fight, we then mention words like freedom, and nice common values that are against freedom and much has been going on privately, the united states is thinking that it is a state of resisting and militance but they incredibly military and notorsitic nation, it is not the views of our selves that we wonna care around but the fact that we are, if the president and the military of the self defense establishement if they decided that there are problems some where in the world we have to bomb them some where in some region this is a ritual that the Unites States has seen for decades.

1953 Gutemala, Iran, Lebanon, Haiti, Cuba, Laos, Thailand, vietnam, Congo, Indonesia, Cameroun, Chilie, Angola, Afghanistan, Lybia, Nikaragua, Salvador, Lebanon, Grenada, Tchad, Bolivia, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Youguslavia... The United States topple goverments we have done cout d'etat, the united states used intelligent services, for corpal services and they have done horribal thinks and they came up with most dictatorial regim in the world they prompt them up, they have been training them how to abuse with the human rights and their own citizents, how to comit human right abuses, todays demons were yesterday friends all on the name either of the cold war, or for a commercial reasons, it's basically economic colonialism no one uses colonialism word but instead of just taking over the country we just have a better way we just go in and settle our market whether we have to sell it to their or we just mind their ressources, we need to be in that country for some reason, therefore we gonna talk about free markets, free trade but what really is going on is that we wonna our compagnies to get rich in your countries that's what it is all about it is about proliferating our PROFIT AND ECONOMY. 

Comprendre les Rouages de la Politique

Il faut se poser la question que se soit sur le niveau national que sur le niveau international, de notre rôle a nous, se qui qui se manifeste dans les pays arabes c'est une prise de conscience aujourd hui il y a des choses qui sont entrain de changer, et on peut finalement s’assoie pour critiquer la gauche ou pour critiquer la droite, critiquer le gouvernement ou critiquer la police, au lieu de se critiquer les uns les autres il faut se lever et se prendre en charge et voir quelles sont les priorités de notre action et si il ya une chose qu'il faudrait analyser dans se qui se passe moi je n 'appel pas se qui s'est passé le printemps arabes par se que le processus n 'est pas encore finit, mais je vais l 'appelai printemps Arabes dans la dimension de se qui se passe, je dis qu'il y a des dynamique extrêmement intéressantes dans le monde Arabe, il ya des mouvements intéressants qu'il faut accompagner, les population aujourd hui sont entrain de dire non, c'est a dire elles expriment le refus d'un ordre, elles expriment le refus d'imposition, elles expriment le refus qu'on pense pour elle et c'est très bien mais il na faut pas être dans la naïveté de l 'optimisme, et ça c'est une attitude intellectuelle qui est déterminante essayons de comprendre se qui se passe ne simplifions rien, vous voyer se qui est entrain de se passer en Egypte aujourd hui, le mouvement qui ne participe pas aux élections puis il participe aux élections et il obtient 24 pourcent cette analyse ne peut pas se faire en oubliant, en faisant table rase de toute cette énergie qui est entrain de s'exprimer et qui aujourd hui vient du sud et dois nous mobiliser nous par se que tout musulman a une liaison historique par rapport a ces mouvements et par rapport a se que nous avons a dire ici et donc deux choses et elle sont simple, c'est a dire la conscience a partir d'un certain moments nous en tant que citoyens et en tant que personne ici se qu'on entends de ses populations qui se sont lever c'est le sens du non c'est le sens, c'est a dire que sa ne peut pas continuer c'est a dire a un moment donner nous avons assez de votre type de discours de votre politique et se que nous voulons se n 'est pas simplement de dire non, mais non a se que nous propose t proposer autre chose et essayer d'avoir une pensée qui soit construite de se point de vue la se double aspect la il est pour moi important et si on a pu voir dans le monde Arabe aujourd hui et si on a pu voir dans le monde Arabe aujourd hui des mouvements qui ont réussi a dire non, qui ausse doivent se poser la question a savoir mais qu'est se qui fait aujourd hui qu'on aille la peine a voir dans le vrai débat du monde arabe aujourd hui qui émerge et qui soit vu, c'est a dire la capacité de dire non mais aussi la capacité de formuler nos positions, donc les islamistes n 'etes pas derrières se mouvement de soulèvement Arabes se n’êtes pas les Islamistes qui ont lancé ses révolutions Arabes, sa ne venait pas des mouvements islamistes et a un moment donner et qui sont des mouvements pousser par la jeunesse ..........se qui est important sans se deuxième temps, a un moment donner lorsqu'on ou lu célébrer ses mouvements on oublier que les populations etés majoritairement musulmanes tout a coup elle eté comme nous donc il fallait célébrer la jeunesse mais ne pas dire quelle type de jeunesse on est entrain de parler, et tout a coup se qui se passe voila réapparaître ses mouvements islamistes que certains sociologues et analystes nous avons dit nous sommes dans l 'air du post islamisme et tout a coup se qui est entrain de se passer et s'est omni  présent les termes du débats sous les termes de la polarisation en faite tout se qui est entrain de se passer c'est les laïques contre les islamistes alors on a deux problèmes alors les deux problèmes les voici s'est que interprété de l histoire et interprète des mouvements il a deux pouvoir avant le pouvoir le pouvoir de la Terminologie et le pouvoir des termes du débat, les termes du débat c'est l 'equation et la terminologie c'est la définition des termes la terminologie c'est qui est qui et les termes du débat c'est  comment il faut comprendre et se a quoi on est arrivé c'est une chose qui est grave par se que on a réduit tout se qui se passe dans le monde Arabe a une polarisation entre les laïques et les islamistes et que pire c'est que les termes de se débats on étés accepter par les acteurs eux mêmes c'est a partir d'un certain moments si vous écouter se qui se passer dans le monde arabe c'est la légitimité des laïque contre les islamistes et la légitime des musulmans a être religieux contre les laïques, les laïques etants l'occident et les islamistes étant les retardés et la on ne peut pas dire que ca vient de l 'occident a force de ceux qui pose les terme du débat c'est se qui sont des objets devienne eux mêmes des acteurs et a un moment dans l 'analyse regarder se qui se passe en Egypte, se qui se passe en Tunisie a un moment donner on ne peut pas ne pas reconnaître que le débat s'est focaliser sur la polarisation sur des islamistes qui fessait tout pour ne pas faire peur des laïques qui faisaient tout pour continuer a faire peurs et dans cette polarisation la et se qui se passe c'est qu'on est entrain de créer l 'autre et qu'on faite comprenez bien se qui est entrain de se passer quelque chose d'assez grave dans le monde Arabe c'est que au moment ou cette polarisation est accepté par les acteurs les vrais questions sociale, économiques et politique ne sont pas poser, c'est a dire quelle type de politique sociale, quel type de politique éducative quel type de politique economique moi sa ne m 'interesse pas des gens qui sont dans la conscience de l 'islam politique repetent dix fois qu'ils ne vont rien faire contre les droits des femmes, ca c'est du discours la vrais réalité, par exemple le droit des femmes c'est par la loi qui passe c'est pas des vraies politiques educatifs c'est des vraies acces a l 'emploie il faut passer a autre chose n'en pas qu'on est gentille mais a montrer qu'on a une alternative et une des chose la plus importante aujourd hui c'est que en majorité des mouvements islamistes aujourd hui n'ont aucun problem avec l 'economie de marché, n'ont aucun problem avec la banque mondiale se qu'on entrain de voir s'est se déplacement la , cette acceptation la et la il faut faire un travail critique d'abord qu'est se que vous allez proposer en tant que alternative economique parler d'economie islamique ca ne la fait pas, l 'economie du style de l 'economie malaisienne l'economie islamique americaniser au bout du compte mc donald c'est bien quand les femmes portent le foulard mais c'est ca qui nous eté vendu, quand tu ailles on malaisie on est aussi grand que les etats unis et en d'autres partie il ya des mouvements de gauches que la legittimité souvent c'est d’être contre les islamistes vous proposer quoi quelle la veritable politique sociale que vous proposez quel est cette esprit que vous proposez et la et il faut comprendre que assimilé ceux ci dans le monde Arabe on fait un travail a pouvoir vasser ca il faut briser cette polarisation, c'est la miroire de se qui se passe en Europe  c'est a dire la polarisation c'est la creation de l'autre vous etes des musulmans Tunisiens mais vous etres un danger pour la laicité on s'en fiche de la laicité tant quelle le marqueur qui va vous mettre dehors donc quand vous dite que vous etes laique et vous respecter la loi c'est pas important le faite de vous etes un musulmans c'est un doute de votre acceptation par la loie en faite se qui sont pres de la loi ne sont pas ceux qui l 'instrumentalise mais qui l 'instrumentalise des fins politiques en faite et on faite qu'on vous essayer de comprendre en faite se qu'on est entrain de nous faire la on est entrain de culuraliser d'islamiser de creer l 'autre de faire un debat sur l 'identité nationale par se qu'on ne veux pas un vrai debat de se qui est la justice sociale des vrais questions economiques les vrais questions de dignité en faite c'est la deplacement  systématique en faite que pendants des annes les multinationales francaises ont laisser a Kaddafi d'espionner ses opposants et de les torturer donc a partir d'un certain moment et lorsqu'on comprends bien c'est qu'il faut briser se cleavage au non de cette citoyeneté commune on ne nous la fera pas nous ne sommes pas des autres et personnes ne doit pas accepter d'etre l 'autre culturel de son concitoyen aujourd hui il faut devenir des sujets au sujet citoyens au sens philosphique qui prennet en charge les vrais questions qui sont les notre on ne veut pas parler d'identité et il ne faut surtout pas il ne faur pas nous fermer dans une identité c'est une inspiration ouverte vers une ethique qui pose des vrais questions sociales et des vrais questions politque et ça  encore une fois je ne vais passer mon temps a critiquer la gauche ou la droite il jour le même jeux, le trait commun entre la droite et la gauche aujourd hui c'est exactement de jouer de la même chose, vous trouverez exactement le même clivage a gauche a droite comme a  l’extrême droite la même chose faire une politique du clivage faire la politique de l 'autre de ceux et derrière tout ça c'est de refuser que les citoyens devienne des sujets mais entretenir le sentiment victimaire se sont des politiques de la peur culturellement de la peur pour éviter les vraies questions qui fâchent que nous devrons mettre en avant on nous casse la tète avec Islamiste contre laïque islamiste contre laïque il faut tout le temps vous mettre a l 'extérieur se n'est pas ca le vrai problème tu peux être se que tu veux mais quelles sont les questions qui sont prioritaire chez toi, t 'es musulman t'es athée, t'es agnostique, t 'es homme t 'es femme quelles sont les questions qui interpellent ton intelligence c'est des questions de justice c'est des questions de dignités c'est des questions de lutte de cohérence, c'est a dire contre toutes les discriminations, contre toutes les inégalités sociale contre toutes les attitude, une femme elle porte le niqab, s'habillent, comme elle veut un homme il fait comme il veut et a partir de se moment dans le mouvement essayer de travailler ensemble, c'est a ça qu'appel se mouvement, il faut le mouvement de pensé et la capacité de dire non, il faut dire après la capacité de dire non quoi c'est çà formuler les questions, avoir dans sa tête et avoir dans son conscient un certain nombre de questions qui sont fondamentales, sur la question de la dignité humaine sur la question de l’éducation, sur la question de la justice sociale sur la question de l 'économie et sur aussi le refus des indignations sélectives de même façon la question palestiniens elle est centrale, labas aussi il faut briser le clivage par se que a un moment donné si t'es pour Hamas t 'es islamiste t'es notre si t'eté pour les laïques t 'es de l 'autre con et de même la question n'est pas d’être avec les laïques ou d’être avec les islamistes la question c'est d’être avec les victimes de se pays ça demande la prise de conscience dont on nous parle ça demande du courage des citoyens et des citoyennes courageux il faut qu'on assume on Etant des arabes et des etres humains, vous etes intéressant pour un mouvement de conscience que lorsque vous gêner ceux qui endorme la conscience, vous n 'etes intéressant dans la résistance politique que lorsque vous gênez ceux qui veulent déplacer ceux qui veulent nous parler de culture et d'identité nous on les parler de justice et de politique et de droit, la vous étés gênant contre se pouvoir la empêcher de tourner en rond, celui qui est a gauche questionner le ou il se trouve a gauche il y en a certain a gauche qu'on ne sait plus ou est la droite  

Behing The Scenes

The political shock of the Jasmine Revolution (“Tunisiami”) first toppled the twenty-three year old House of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia in twenty-eight days, the thirty year old House of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in eighteen days and now after nine days of protests the forty-one year House of Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi in Libya totters on the edge. In the case of Libya a combination of regime defectors and criminal violence against its own citizens comprehensively delegitimize the regime in the eyes of its own people. Peaceful protest in Bahrain and Iran is met with incumbent regime force, while Morocco, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria all report protest.

How to interpret these events that reverberate around the region and beyond? Is this an Arab Spring leading to transition democratization, akin to 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe? Or rather can we look to 1979 in Iran, and the prospect of Sunni theocracy taking hold? Or should we look to the wider Moslem world - Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey - and draw the conclusion that sustainable political systems and regimes which will emerge in the Arab Middle East will ipso facto be heterogeneous - acceptable to elites and societies, appropriate to indigenous, histories, traditions and narratives and affordable. What are the lessons which other Middle Eastern incumbent regimes will identify from the causes and consequences of the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya? How might those lessons be learned?

False Orthodoxies

Egypt’s stability under Mubarak was guaranteed by two compacts. The first was agreed between the regime and the US: Egypt supports the peace treaty with Israel and ensures access to cheap energy; the US would stay out of Egyptian internal affairs. The second between the Mubarak regime and the Egyptian people: the regime monopolises political and economic power; societal living conditions steadily improve.

The first pact was badly damaged by 9/11; the second was badly frayed, ready to break after a decade- long economic stagnation. Food and energy price hikes, high youth unemployment (two-thirds of the population is under 30 and 25% unemployed), corruption, nepotism and dignity deficits (with 40% of the population living on less than $2 a day) all served to highlight the gaps and disparities between elite regime performance legitimacy rhetoric and the societal daily realities. Nonetheless, radical transformation was considered a mirage: the state is too powerful; opposition too divided; the media easily muzzled. That these nostrums have been turned on their head by events in Egypt is clear, but to what strategic effect?

First, the powerful nature of incumbent regimes, buttressed as they are by a “deep state” and Western external legitimation all support continuity of the status quo. Societal and elite perceptions as to the loyalty, cohesion and resiliency of a pro-regime “securitocracy” – the security and intelligence services, the military and business elites closely connected to the ruling families – have shifted radically. The pyramid of Egyptian power has proved to be a brittle facade that in reality was built on shifting sand: the Pharaoh had no clothes. The deft positioning of the Egyptian military, the central establishment pillar, as a would-be honest broker between the Mubarak regime and society underscores this reality, as does the speed at which fair-weather Western friends (France in the case of Tunisia), the United States with regards to Egypt) have abandoned erstwhile long-standing strategic partners in the region.

Second, Egypt’s society comprising of 80 million people may be fragmented between secular, nationalist, Islamist factions, between the ideologically motivated forces of conservatism and modernity, between pragmatists and extremists and the apolitical or simply apathetic, but events indicate that a leaderless and disunited opposition rooted in society paradoxically renders it a more powerful force. It promotes the emergence of a hard-to-challenge key societal message delivered in demotic terms – “Game Over!” and “"Bread, freedom and human dignity”. The tired paternalistic mantra of deeply unpopular incumbents - “hold onto nurse for fear of something worse” in the shape of violent revolution and repressive theocracy - could not regain control of the narrative. With whom can the incumbent regimes negotiate, decapitate or co-opt if society is resilient, stubborn, united in opposition and leaderless?

Third, the role of instantaneous information communication technologies, not least social networking, has been highlighted as catalytic. Indeed, the crises in Tunisia and Egypt are characterised as the first Facebook and Twitter social revolutionary movements. Alongside satellite TV (Al-Jazeera), such on-line real-time technologies serve to heighten awareness, build and shape political solidarity, identity and cohesion around a message rather than individual. They enable peer pressure and authority operating in virtual space to coordinate and organise mass protest on the streets and squares of the capital. The state can impede but not silence the new media and plugged-in opposition: linear sclerotic state hierarchies and apparatus staffed by placemen and led by tone-deaf elite elders are outmanoeuvred by a networked, mass educated, urbanised and globalized new generation, proud of their traditions and heritage and desperate for change.

Unlike the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) and Orange Revolution Ukraine (2004), allegations that Western NGOs, embassies and security services are running post-modern coup d’états in the region are not a feature. This reflects two realities. The first, that the toppling of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and now Libya are clearly societal-led internal revolutions. Second, in the case of Tunisia and Egypt at least, the incumbent regimes were strategically orientated towards the US and alternatives reflecting the perception of the “Arab street” almost certainly will not be, at least to the same extent with regards to Western unconditional support to Israel.

Transition Traps?

It is still too early ascertain with real certainty which lessons ruling regimes in the region will identify and then learn (through changing policies, programme priorities, resource and budgetary allocations) from the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. However, it can be agreed that as Egypt has the Arab world’s largest, oldest and deepest culture and civilization, it is a benchmark for the region. It is in transition, but transition to what?  What was a virtue during the revolutionary phase of regime-change – a leaderless peaceful radicalised population – may turn into a vice during a period of negotiations and agenda setting that marks the next, favouring organised pre-existing interest groups to optimise their influence at the expense of society as a whole.

Three potential scenarios could unfold in post-Mubarak Egypt. First, a soft-landing managed “orderly transition” towards a reinvented democracy and the emergence of a state-building project modelled on Indonesia or Turkey over the longer-term. Second, greater repression could be unleashed by reactionary “pro-stability/regime” old guard and interests and attempt to reinforce and legitimise autocratic nationalism. Might the Supreme Military Council look to conflate the national interest with its own - military controlled industries and defence contracts account for a 15% share of GDP? Third, chaos, anarchy and civil war or a 1979 Iranian-style Islamist takeover constitute the default options if either process stalls and fails. So goes Egypt, so goes the region?

Some states may still be in ‘wait-and-see’ mode, caution and deliberative discussion being the prudent choice. Two other strategic responses are even now possible: accelerate or initiate regime-led reform processes; accelerate or initiate regime-led reaction efforts. Both are predicated on the notion that the writing is now on the wall, change is coming and states that want to avoid ‘inevitable’ chaos and anarchy of a security vacuum need to get ahead of the curve. But each draw radically different conclusions from these agreed premises.

On the one hand, enlightened reform factions within states in which economic, political and military power is monopolised by corrupt closed elites-for-life will be emboldened to conclude that “getting ahead of the curve” involves anticipating societal need for change by proactively calling for free and fair parliamentary elections (guaranteed by international monitors), with the promise that the Constitution will be rewritten to address dignity deficits. For states that opt for this pathway – and Jordan appears an exemplar - the internal debates will centre on how far and how fast the process of reform unfolds rather than the general strategic orientation and ultimate end-goal. Here the Egypt demonstration effect proves a powerful driver, buttressed by media reportage and raised societal expectations. For energy rich states in the region higher oil prices (the psychologically $100 pa threshold has been crossed) may provide a cushion to offset social, economic and political disruption (‘the J-curve’) as the political system shifts. The underlying rationale is not a Damascene-like conversion to democracy, but rather a basic survival instinct and political calculation that places self-preservation above all other considerations. To paraphrase Charles Darwin, regimes are like species, those that survive are not the strongest or most intelligent, but rather the most adaptable.

On the other hand, as Libya (helicopter gunships against the population) and to a lesser extent Bahrain (Pearl Roundabout on 17 February), demonstrate incumbent regimes may conclude that “getting ahead of the curve” involves proactively tightening the screws on society through more severe monitoring of public and virtual spaces. The orchestrated use of coercive force is a first rather than last resort, with pro-regime “pro-stability” proxy forces (thugs) waiting in the wings to use terror to break an opposition, allowing classical state structures and institutions to stand above the fray, maintain their legitimacy, and then intervene for the good of society to “restore order”. Compensatory safety-valves could include greater ant-Israeli/US rhetoric, ethno-nationalist mobilization and increased militarism – all paid for courtesy of the ‘Egypt effect’ on higher oil prices. Given the lukewarm incumbent regime support from the West in their hour of need, initiating a search among the ‘Authoritarian International’ for more reliable strategic partners will become a priority. Emergent or Great Powers will be a focus. Again, internal incumbent regime debates focus on means rather than ends: how much force, where and when to apply it, which alternative strategic partners? Here the calculation is that autocracies are indeed adaptable: they can become even more autocratic.

New Strategic Calculus

If it is true that most Middle Eastern analysts whether in the region or the West, in government service or in academia, did not predict the scale of protest, all now seek to provide policy-relevant assessments. Western public support for representative and participatory institutions, structures and processes in the region rather than elite personalities looks set to grow, whatever the reality in private. Events in Egypt make more acute and visible the central tension and contradiction in Western foreign policy towards Middle East autocracies. First, the Western strategic interests - regional stability, the continuity of Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace – are secured through long-standing strategic partnership with US-backed autocratic security-providers. Second, and simultaneously, the West has sought to promote its democratic principles and values-system in the shape of accountable and transparent market-democratic states.

Given real world practical calculations and realities, can there be a prudent blend of the two? At what point to pivot to counter-elites when longstanding incumbent allies become albatrosses? When and in what manner to apply coordinated external leverage (disclosure/freezing of incumbent assets; redrafting military-aid conditionality) while still ensuring a dignified orderly transition? How can grass-roots activists demanding regime-change be supported in Egypt without extending such support to all mass protest? How to avoid the unintended consequences that such external support is not used be incumbents, as is the case in Iran with the ‘Green Revolution’, to delegitimize the very protest it seeks to succour?

Could a Euro-Atlantic Marshall Plan to the Middle East help buttress democratization efforts by alleviating immediate societal needs (food, health, employment)? Is a coherent strategic approach to the region still possible as it self-differentiated further or does interaction with the Middle East remain contingent and transactional? Will transition democratization Arab states help contain Iran, keep the peace with Israel and allow for uninterrupted energy flows from the Middle East? If Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen do not fall primarily within the West’s security system, then whose? Lastly, and most importantly, how can the Egyptian crisis be utilised as an opportunity to re-address the issue of fractious relations between Israel and its neighbours?

An Arab Spring

Tunisia and Egypt’s political and social evolution through 2011 constitutes an exemplar for both states in the greater Middle East region, from Casablanca to Kabul, as well as current and potential future strategic partners around the world. Not only is Sunni Arab leadership in question, but more importantly the sources of its legitimacy – the narratives of defiance of the West, resistance to Israel, autocratic nationalism appears exhausted. Might the new Sunni centre be societal based and consumed satellite channel TV – a virtual real-time space the constructs a narrative of pan-Arab unity for the second decade of the 21^st century? Internet access and social media subscription levels and, as importantly, the capacity of incumbent regimes to ‘manage’, censor and block such technology has proved to be a key factor: how large, vibrant and free are virtual societies throughout the region?

Pre-existing “authoritarian stability first” or “democratic disorder and Islamist theocratic chaos” dichotomies look set to be proved false in the coming days and weeks. The spectre of an Islamist Muslim Brotherhood takeover emerging as a default position reduces with Mubarak’s fall, further undercutting incumbent narratives. The obstacles to grassroots-triggered transitional governments acceptable to the military and society appear less than previously understood. The rules of the game are changing and a transformed societal-based collective consciousness sets new benchmarks, expectations and thresholds by which to judge incumbents. This Arab winter of discontent will be made glorious summer if denial, stupidity, greed and all too human hubris does not win out: arrogance truly does diminish wisdom.

The Actual Reminder

The political shock of the Jasmine Revolution (“Tunisiami”) first toppled the twenty-three year old House of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia in twenty-eight days, the thirty year old House of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in eighteen days and now after nine days of protests the forty-one year House of Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi in Libya totters on the edge. In the case of Libya a combination of regime defectors and criminal violence against its own citizens comprehensively delegitimize the regime in the eyes of its own people. Peaceful protest in Bahrain and Iran is met with incumbent regime force, while Morocco, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria all report protest.

How to interpret these events that reverberate around the region and beyond? Is this an Arab Spring leading to transition democratization, akin to 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe? Or rather can we look to 1979 in Iran, and the prospect of Sunni theocracy taking hold? Or should we look to the wider Moslem world - Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey - and draw the conclusion that sustainable political systems and regimes which will emerge in the Arab Middle East will ipso facto be heterogeneous - acceptable to elites and societies, appropriate to indigenous, histories, traditions and narratives and affordable. What are the lessons which other Middle Eastern incumbent regimes will identify from the causes and consequences of the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya? How might those lessons be learned?

False Orthodoxies

Egypt’s stability under Mubarak was guaranteed by two compacts. The first was agreed between the regime and the US: Egypt supports the peace treaty with Israel and ensures access to cheap energy; the US would stay out of Egyptian internal affairs. The second between the Mubarak regime and the Egyptian people: the regime monopolises political and economic power; societal living conditions steadily improve.

The first pact was badly damaged by 9/11; the second was badly frayed, ready to break after a decade- long economic stagnation. Food and energy price hikes, high youth unemployment (two-thirds of the population is under 30 and 25% unemployed), corruption, nepotism and dignity deficits (with 40% of the population living on less than $2 a day) all served to highlight the gaps and disparities between elite regime performance legitimacy rhetoric and the societal daily realities. Nonetheless, radical transformation was considered a mirage: the state is too powerful; opposition too divided; the media easily muzzled. That these nostrums have been turned on their head by events in Egypt is clear, but to what strategic effect?

First, the powerful nature of incumbent regimes, buttressed as they are by a “deep state” and Western external legitimation all support continuity of the status quo. Societal and elite perceptions as to the loyalty, cohesion and resiliency of a pro-regime “securitocracy” – the security and intelligence services, the military and business elites closely connected to the ruling families – have shifted radically. The pyramid of Egyptian power has proved to be a brittle facade that in reality was built on shifting sand: the Pharaoh had no clothes. The deft positioning of the Egyptian military, the central establishment pillar, as a would-be honest broker between the Mubarak regime and society underscores this reality, as does the speed at which fair-weather Western friends (France in the case of Tunisia), the United States with regards to Egypt) have abandoned erstwhile long-standing strategic partners in the region.

Second, Egypt’s society comprising of 80 million people may be fragmented between secular, nationalist, Islamist factions, between the ideologically motivated forces of conservatism and modernity, between pragmatists and extremists and the apolitical or simply apathetic, but events indicate that a leaderless and disunited opposition rooted in society paradoxically renders it a more powerful force. It promotes the emergence of a hard-to-challenge key societal message delivered in demotic terms – “Game Over!” and “"Bread, freedom and human dignity”. The tired paternalistic mantra of deeply unpopular incumbents - “hold onto nurse for fear of something worse” in the shape of violent revolution and repressive theocracy - could not regain control of the narrative. With whom can the incumbent regimes negotiate, decapitate or co-opt if society is resilient, stubborn, united in opposition and leaderless?

Third, the role of instantaneous information communication technologies, not least social networking, has been highlighted as catalytic. Indeed, the crises in Tunisia and Egypt are characterised as the first Facebook and Twitter social revolutionary movements. Alongside satellite TV (Al-Jazeera), such on-line real-time technologies serve to heighten awareness, build and shape political solidarity, identity and cohesion around a message rather than individual. They enable peer pressure and authority operating in virtual space to coordinate and organise mass protest on the streets and squares of the capital. The state can impede but not silence the new media and plugged-in opposition: linear sclerotic state hierarchies and apparatus staffed by placemen and led by tone-deaf elite elders are outmanoeuvred by a networked, mass educated, urbanised and globalized new generation, proud of their traditions and heritage and desperate for change.

Unlike the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) and Orange Revolution Ukraine (2004), allegations that Western NGOs, embassies and security services are running post-modern coup d’états in the region are not a feature. This reflects two realities. The first, that the toppling of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and now Libya are clearly societal-led internal revolutions. Second, in the case of Tunisia and Egypt at least, the incumbent regimes were strategically orientated towards the US and alternatives reflecting the perception of the “Arab street” almost certainly will not be, at least to the same extent with regards to Western unconditional support to Israel.

Transition Traps?

It is still too early ascertain with real certainty which lessons ruling regimes in the region will identify and then learn (through changing policies, programme priorities, resource and budgetary allocations) from the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. However, it can be agreed that as Egypt has the Arab world’s largest, oldest and deepest culture and civilization, it is a benchmark for the region. It is in transition, but transition to what?  What was a virtue during the revolutionary phase of regime-change – a leaderless peaceful radicalised population – may turn into a vice during a period of negotiations and agenda setting that marks the next, favouring organised pre-existing interest groups to optimise their influence at the expense of society as a whole.

Three potential scenarios could unfold in post-Mubarak Egypt. First, a soft-landing managed “orderly transition” towards a reinvented democracy and the emergence of a state-building project modelled on Indonesia or Turkey over the longer-term. Second, greater repression could be unleashed by reactionary “pro-stability/regime” old guard and interests and attempt to reinforce and legitimise autocratic nationalism. Might the Supreme Military Council look to conflate the national interest with its own - military controlled industries and defence contracts account for a 15% share of GDP? Third, chaos, anarchy and civil war or a 1979 Iranian-style Islamist takeover constitute the default options if either process stalls and fails. So goes Egypt, so goes the region?

Some states may still be in ‘wait-and-see’ mode, caution and deliberative discussion being the prudent choice. Two other strategic responses are even now possible: accelerate or initiate regime-led reform processes; accelerate or initiate regime-led reaction efforts. Both are predicated on the notion that the writing is now on the wall, change is coming and states that want to avoid ‘inevitable’ chaos and anarchy of a security vacuum need to get ahead of the curve. But each draw radically different conclusions from these agreed premises.

On the one hand, enlightened reform factions within states in which economic, political and military power is monopolised by corrupt closed elites-for-life will be emboldened to conclude that “getting ahead of the curve” involves anticipating societal need for change by proactively calling for free and fair parliamentary elections (guaranteed by international monitors), with the promise that the Constitution will be rewritten to address dignity deficits. For states that opt for this pathway – and Jordan appears an exemplar - the internal debates will centre on how far and how fast the process of reform unfolds rather than the general strategic orientation and ultimate end-goal. Here the Egypt demonstration effect proves a powerful driver, buttressed by media reportage and raised societal expectations. For energy rich states in the region higher oil prices (the psychologically $100 pa threshold has been crossed) may provide a cushion to offset social, economic and political disruption (‘the J-curve’) as the political system shifts. The underlying rationale is not a Damascene-like conversion to democracy, but rather a basic survival instinct and political calculation that places self-preservation above all other considerations. To paraphrase Charles Darwin, regimes are like species, those that survive are not the strongest or most intelligent, but rather the most adaptable.

On the other hand, as Libya (helicopter gunships against the population) and to a lesser extent Bahrain (Pearl Roundabout on 17 February), demonstrate incumbent regimes may conclude that “getting ahead of the curve” involves proactively tightening the screws on society through more severe monitoring of public and virtual spaces. The orchestrated use of coercive force is a first rather than last resort, with pro-regime “pro-stability” proxy forces (thugs) waiting in the wings to use terror to break an opposition, allowing classical state structures and institutions to stand above the fray, maintain their legitimacy, and then intervene for the good of society to “restore order”. Compensatory safety-valves could include greater ant-Israeli/US rhetoric, ethno-nationalist mobilization and increased militarism – all paid for courtesy of the ‘Egypt effect’ on higher oil prices. Given the lukewarm incumbent regime support from the West in their hour of need, initiating a search among the ‘Authoritarian International’ for more reliable strategic partners will become a priority. Emergent or Great Powers will be a focus. Again, internal incumbent regime debates focus on means rather than ends: how much force, where and when to apply it, which alternative strategic partners? Here the calculation is that autocracies are indeed adaptable: they can become even more autocratic.

New Strategic Calculus

If it is true that most Middle Eastern analysts whether in the region or the West, in government service or in academia, did not predict the scale of protest, all now seek to provide policy-relevant assessments. Western public support for representative and participatory institutions, structures and processes in the region rather than elite personalities looks set to grow, whatever the reality in private. Events in Egypt make more acute and visible the central tension and contradiction in Western foreign policy towards Middle East autocracies. First, the Western strategic interests - regional stability, the continuity of Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace – are secured through long-standing strategic partnership with US-backed autocratic security-providers. Second, and simultaneously, the West has sought to promote its democratic principles and values-system in the shape of accountable and transparent market-democratic states.

Given real world practical calculations and realities, can there be a prudent blend of the two? At what point to pivot to counter-elites when longstanding incumbent allies become albatrosses? When and in what manner to apply coordinated external leverage (disclosure/freezing of incumbent assets; redrafting military-aid conditionality) while still ensuring a dignified orderly transition? How can grass-roots activists demanding regime-change be supported in Egypt without extending such support to all mass protest? How to avoid the unintended consequences that such external support is not used be incumbents, as is the case in Iran with the ‘Green Revolution’, to delegitimize the very protest it seeks to succour?

Could a Euro-Atlantic Marshall Plan to the Middle East help buttress democratization efforts by alleviating immediate societal needs (food, health, employment)? Is a coherent strategic approach to the region still possible as it self-differentiated further or does interaction with the Middle East remain contingent and transactional? Will transition democratization Arab states help contain Iran, keep the peace with Israel and allow for uninterrupted energy flows from the Middle East? If Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen do not fall primarily within the West’s security system, then whose? Lastly, and most importantly, how can the Egyptian crisis be utilised as an opportunity to re-address the issue of fractious relations between Israel and its neighbours?

An Arab Spring

Tunisia and Egypt’s political and social evolution through 2011 constitutes an exemplar for both states in the greater Middle East region, from Casablanca to Kabul, as well as current and potential future strategic partners around the world. Not only is Sunni Arab leadership in question, but more importantly the sources of its legitimacy – the narratives of defiance of the West, resistance to Israel, autocratic nationalism appears exhausted. Might the new Sunni centre be societal based and consumed satellite channel TV – a virtual real-time space the constructs a narrative of pan-Arab unity for the second decade of the 21^st century? Internet access and social media subscription levels and, as importantly, the capacity of incumbent regimes to ‘manage’, censor and block such technology has proved to be a key factor: how large, vibrant and free are virtual societies throughout the region?

Pre-existing “authoritarian stability first” or “democratic disorder and Islamist theocratic chaos” dichotomies look set to be proved false in the coming days and weeks. The spectre of an Islamist Muslim Brotherhood takeover emerging as a default position reduces with Mubarak’s fall, further undercutting incumbent narratives. The obstacles to grassroots-triggered transitional governments acceptable to the military and society appear less than previously understood. The rules of the game are changing and a transformed societal-based collective consciousness sets new benchmarks, expectations and thresholds by which to judge incumbents. This Arab winter of discontent will be made glorious summer if denial, stupidity, greed and all too human hubris does not win out: arrogance truly does diminish wisdom.

Ben Ali Behind Borders

Notes from Tunisia: Did the US Give Green Light for Ben Ali’s Overthrow?

Rob Prince | Dec 14, 2011 | 12 comments | Short URL: http://wp.me/p16NIR-2Lx

This piece appeared originally on Counterpunch.

A friend, relative of a Tunisian family in Colorado, today took me for a ride in the hills above the Mediterranean just 2 kilometers north of La Marsa. On the way, we passed the residency of the French Ambassador and nearby, one of the trashed out mansions of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi clans, the two ruling clans that ran the country into the ground economically and politically. The gutted mansion stood on the corner of the road to Gammarth by the Mediterranean where it bisects Rue Hannibal. Down the block is a chic looking restaurant called `Le Cafe Journal.’

The mansion belonged to Imad Trabelsi, one of Leila Trabelsi’s nephews, recently sentenced to 18 years in prison by a post Ben Ali tribunal. One of the graffiti notes left on the wall filled with slogans against the Ben Ali years read `Dear Imad – Thanks for the wall – signed Abdel Aziz.’ The place was thoroughly trashed, pulverized really, as if hit by a drone missile gone astray from Pakistan! All the other Ben Ali – Trabelsi mansions, many of them, like this one built on property expropriated from the state to the two families – lie in similar ruin. Not roped off, they remain open to the public.

A person can just walk in and look around as we did. Trabelsi did not get along well with the neighbors and didn’t seem to care. The unbridled arrogance of the nouveau riche! Trabelsi had the neighbors pay for a retaining wall within the property to insure privacy. The mansion hosted loud and wild parties, almost non-stop I was told. The neighbors complained to the police, the police came and arrested the neighbors for disturbing the party rather than the party-ers for disturbing the peace. In quiet revenge, Trabelsi’s neighbors did not lift a finger to stop the popular rage against the property . Not many tears were thus shed when the Trabelsis fled.

I wondered, with the French residence being so close, how close the Trabelsis were to the French diplomats who protected and defended the old order down till the end and at how many Trabelsi wild soirees the French ambassador (or other French diplomats) might have been regulars. Did the ambassador pass by to check out the damage, symbolic at least on some level of the damage done to French – Tunisian relations as well. Because France took something of a diplomatic hit from the Tunisian crisis.

General Rachid Ammar’s Dilemma

Just at the time Zine el Abidine Ben Ali – whose name in Tunisia today is worth less than mud – fled Tunisia with a million Tunisians cheering him on to go, a curious article appeared in the French press. It was curious because of its content and brevity. It alleged that the chief of the Tunisian army, General Rachid Ammar was at a loss as to whether or not to obey Ben Ali’s orders to mow down protesters with machine guns from armored vehicles and helicopters.

General Ammar, who has slipped back into obscurity, was caught in the middle between Ben Ali and the Tunisian people. Caught in one of those `damned if you do – damned if you don’t’ moments. His crisis was being unable to discern at the time which side in the fight between Ben Ali and `the people’ would come out the winner. Before January 12, 2011 when 150,000 people demonstrated against Ben Ali in Sfax in a demonstration called by the country’s union movement – the UGTT – it was not at all clear who would win – Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi (who was hated in some quarters here in Tunisia even more than the president) or the Tunisian people. Given that making the wrong decision could have cost General Ammar dearly , he needed to weigh his decision carefully.

It is exactly at crisis moments like this that former President George Bush tells us, that he consulted God. Maybe General Ammar did too, but if the French press is right, Ammar also was in close contact with, the then acting head of Africom, General William Ward whom the French suggest played a key if not decisive role in influencing Ammar’s decision, helping the Tunisian chief of staff understand which ways the political winds were blowing. Apparently the United States was betting against Ben Ali. Whatever advice General Ward offered to Ammar, it was enough to help give the good man enough spine needed to refuse Ben Ali’s order to slay his own people at will.

And for that, Ammar became and remains something of a Tunisian national hero, `le centurion du peuple’ coming only behind the immolated Mohammed Bouazzizi and the million or so demonstrators that marched on Tunis, calling on Ben Ali to make a hasty departure.

The French press revealed the details of the Ammar-Ward relationship at that sensitive moment. Let us be clear here, theirs is more than a personal connection. The contact marked a quiet watershed in U.S. Tunisian ties. The French were not pleased the Americans had gotten to Ammar before they did and so the story was leaked in bits and pieces in an effort to press the French government to define itself more clearly on the Tunisian crisis. France defended Ben Ali almost up to the last second, the United States shifted gears and gambled against Ben Ali in the last two seconds, so the U.S. stuck it to France and positioned itself well to influence the flow of events in the post Ben Ali period.

France, as nervous about losing its influence in North Africa as it is concerned about the crisis of the euro, responded by trying to regain the influence in Libya which it had lost in Tunisia by pushing NATO to take military action against Khadaffi.

The Americans didn’t mind if France got its claws in Libya which would be a mess for a long time and therefore be more France’s problem than the U.S.’s. Besides Washington could argue this time that it was France that was too quick on the trigger taking a little pressure off what the U.S. was doing unsuccessfully in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and unofficially in Yemen, Somalia and who knows where else. In the end Tunisia would be a much easier country to `help rebuild’, Libya more difficult. A U.S. foothold in Tunisia has its own strategic logic, in line perhaps with AFRICOM plans for Africa? Not a bad deal.

Let’s look at the chain of events.

There were signs – today not all that difficult to read – that the U.S. was at least positioning itself for a post Ben Ali future. It is not that the U.S. engineered the changes, but more that in the Tunisan case, they tried jumping on a running horse rather than blowing it out of existence with bunker busters, smart bombs and torture.

First there some of the WikiLeaks dealing with Tunisia making it clear that the State Department had no illusions about Ben Ali’s lack of popularity, his repressive politics and the money-grabbing nature of the crudely nouveau riche Ben Ali and Trabelsi clans.

The statements of the current U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, Gordon Gray, himself a former Peace Corps Volunteer in Morocco I am told, has consistently praised the transition away from Ben Ali-ism and seems to have played a role in the emerging U.S. approach

The evidence is mounting that the U.S. was not unhappy to see Ben Ali go and when they had the opportunity, let that be known to General Ammar through the medium of AFRICOM commander William Ward. The suggestion that came with Ward’s comments – made either directly or in a more coded manner – was like manna from Heaven for Ammar. he could assume, rightly or wrongly, that the weight of the United States was behind him, helping prop up his confidence to stand down Ben Ali.

An article appeared today (December 11, 2011) taking up the issue of the new U.S.-Tunisian relationship. Nawaat.org, an human rights alternative website, published a piece in French by Farhat Othman, former diplomat expelled by Ben Ali for not towing the party line in the 1990s. His piece is entitled La verite sur la revolution tunisienne en dix points (The Tunisian Revolution’s Truths Explained in 10 points) in which he asserts that the U.S. supported Ben Ali’s overthrow, why the Tunisians took the U.S. bait, and what the nature of the evolving U.S.- Tunisian relationship could look like.

Perhaps Othman will elaborate on these points in the future, but let me say that for the moment, his is a coherent, credible explanation of the U.S. role.

Given the overall record of the United States in the region, complimenting the United States, U.S. Middle East policy in any way in Tunisia is not easy. Othman is taking a lot of heat. His reward for putting forth his ideas so far has mostly to be thoroughly trashed by readers comments, but I think that he has come as close as anyone to explaining the hows and whys of the new U.S – Tunisian relationship.

Othman begins by calling the uprising in Tunisia, now nearly a year old, a `people’s coup’ and gives it his full support. In so doing, Othman begins by paying homage to those who actually made the revolution: the country’s youth who paid the price with their blood and suffering. It is not particularly original but it reveals the deep respect and love that the Tunisian people as a whole feel for their youth, those that showed a courage that many older people here could not quite muster, a courage not for themselves but for the country as a whole and in so doing rekindled the wholesome fires that is a long suppressed Tunisian nationalism.

What follows however is more original and probably explains what triggered the negative responses.

Othman states unequivocally that the Tunisian revolution could not have succeeded on its own without the green light from Washington and the media coverage the protest movement here enjoyed from Al Jazeera. He credits `the green light’ as the key element that gave the Tunisian military the courage not to fire on demonstrators; that corresponds to what I argued above.

I would only add here, that Tunisians did not go asking kindly for permission, with Washington agreeing. It was rather that unable in any way to control the flow of events in Tunisia (or elsewhere in the region these days) the Obama Administration had, for a change, the good sense to roll with the punches so to speak and make the best of it. Had Obama not seen it in U.S. interests to help push Ben Ali aside, he could have made life much more difficult for Tunisia’s social movement.

Othman goes on to claim that Washington’s support for the changes in Tunisia are not as strange as it might seem. Without mentioning the specific cases, he is referring to the U.S. policy of abandoning allies when they are no longer useful. Cases like Marcos of the Philippines, Mobutu of Zaire come to mind. There are many more examples. At times, U.S. global interests needs new face as the old ones have become more a liability than an asset. So it was with Ben Ali. Supporting him too long backfires politically. The U.S. understood this. Sarkozy didn’t until it was too late. Othman’s point here is that to suggest that the United States was preparing for some kind of change like this in the Arab World.

The U.S. Middle East policy has been in crisis for some time. No secret. Some (I’m one of them) would go further and say that it is, overall, in shambles with no long term strategy, a more and more militarized policy which just stumbles from one crisis to another. No vision, No de Gaulles to save us from ourselves. It is a policy that has welded virtually every U.S. administration since World War 2 to Arab tyrants – secular and religious, and Israeli policies against the Palestinians and neighboring Arab people.

To that overall structural rot, long percolating, add the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The combined impact of these policies has led to a precipitous loss of U.S. prestige throughout the region. At some point…and it sure seems we’re almost there, the negative reaction that these policies have triggered boil over that they threaten U.S strategic regional interests there (specifically oil and natural gas) unless things change.

Supporting the Tunisian `people’s coup’ gave Washington to change course just to the slightest degree and to identify with the historic movement of the Arab peoples, rather than against it…and of course slap the French in the face (it really is a very small slap actually) which pleases Washington.

A new alliance?

The more controversial part of Othman’s hypothesis is that he openly credits the United States for having helped enable the Tunisian changes and doesn’t really mind giving the Obama Administration credit for it. It takes a bit of courage to defend that position, and courage on Nawaat’s part to publish the piece too. The argument is simply that for a moment in time, without illusions, the needs of Tunisian democracy coincide with developing U.S. strategy in the region. Not a marriage of love, but one of convenience.

Othman makes this argument in a classically Tunisian manner. It is not out of ignorance of the overall U.S. role in the Middle East. Tunisians, of left, right or center are not stupid. Comes with being a small country! To survive you have to be brighter than bigger and frankly not very nice neighbors – Algeria and Libya. The more I watch Tunisian foreign policy, the more I am impressed by both its cosmopolitan nature and its political pragmatism. Tunisians know Washington. But they also know that their close relationship with France over decades have yielded them little to nothing.

Othman speaks of France’s claims of solidarity with Tunisia as being `no more than words, and essentially demogagic’ He ‘s got French Tunisia policy pegged. So what does Tunisia have to lose by distancing itself from France and edging closer to the United States which is just acting, , as any imperialist power would act, trying to enhance its strategic interests in the region and improve its image by befriending Tunisia?

This is not the line of reasoning the line of reasoning of a Tunisian neo-conservative pandering to Washington instead of Paris. It is something far different from what I can understand, although it is a gamble for Tunisia rolling the dice with Washington, obviously.

Then what is it?

Practical choices for small countries are rather limited, at least within the framework of traditional world politics. Tunisia finds itself caught in the dilemma of many of the world’s small countries, trapped as potential pawns in the big power game to try to figure out which way the wind is blowing and what alliances to make with the world powers that might further their national interests.

So… without the U.S. green light, the Tunisian revolution could have turned to a blood bath. In recognition of the U.S. role, Tunisia opens a new page its relations with the United States, downgrading them a bit (here let’s not exaggerate too much) with Paris. Onn the basis premise, Othman is on target . Ghannouchi’s `informal’ invitation to the U.S. only reinforces the validity of his views. U.S. – Tunisian approaches are being coordinated. Ghannouchi was careful not to let any issue that might sidetrack the cooperation – like adding a section of the proposed constitution to complicate the relations. He has made other gestures in the direction of damage control as well.

Somewhere along the way, the United States has decided that it will cooperate with Ennahdha and that there is a new U.S.-Ennahdha strategic relationship in the making. Indeed it is already made.

Othman gives the Obama Administration credit for understanding Ennahdha better than the French have. The French fear it as yet another manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism masked with a cover of European liberalism. There are some Tunisians here, by the way who feel likewise.

The new alliance builds on similar relations the United States has with Turkey. It shows a modicum of realism, a willingness to deal with a Middle East country more on its own terms, rather on terms dictated by Washington and as such, also is an admission of declining U.S. influence as Washington can no longer dictate Middle East policy. It needs to be more flexible to maintain its interests. It is the beginning of recognition in the U.S. Administration of a need for a changed U.S. policy, perhaps too little too late . U.S. policy in the Middle East has done enormous damage already that will not be so easily undone.

Yes, there are many problems with this strategic alliance both from Tunisian and the United States point of view but in a region where the U.S. is drowning in bad and inhumane policies – contrast its current support for Tunisian democracy with its policies towards much more strategically important Egypt, it is at least a glimmer of hope on an otherwise dark regional tableau.